ABSTRACT: The works of Michael Lebowitz and Moishe Postone express the potentials and difficulties of re-actualizing in contemporary conditions the approach towards subjectivity in Capital pioneered by Lukács in History and Class Consciousness. Lebowitz and Postone each develop ideas consonant with the "antinomies" within Lukács' thought: his wager on the proletariat and his theory of reification respectively. However, both thinkers overlook the intimate relationship between ideological crisis and subjectivity in HCC, indicating that the conceptual productivity of Lukács' thought has not yet been exhausted. This insight suggests manifold connections with recent efforts by radical philosophers, such as Negri, Badiou and Žižek, to articulate the possibility of an emancipatory project to overcome capitalism. The theoretical strong suits of a Lukácsian framework (locating the historical specificity of capitalist society, providing a philosophy of process, the re-politicization of political economy) remain under-explored resources for mitigating the difficulties confronting these ruptural conceptions of subjectivity.

Introduction

Recent works of radical philosophy by thinkers such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek have tended to focus on the question of subjectivity (for example, Badiou, 2007; Žižek, 1999). The fidelity of these philosophers towards the figure of Marx, yet their ambivalent attitude towards his critique of political economy reminds us of David Harvey’s diagnosis that “the duality of the worker as an ‘object for capital’ and a ‘living creative
subject’ has never been adequately resolved in Marxist theory” (Harvey, 1999, 114).

I will evaluate two distinctive interpretations of the theme of subjectivity in Marx’s Capital. In Time, Labor and Social Domination (hereafter TLSD; Postone, 1993), Moishe Postone takes up Marx’s characterization of capital as a “self-moving substance” (Marx, 1990, 256) to posit capital as the subject of its own process, as the primary subject of Capital. While Postone’s investigation clarifies our understanding of the aspect of capital as a non-personal social domination, his view has been challenged by a number of critics (e.g., Bonefeld, 2004), suggesting that his reconstruction of Marx’s categories is unable to account for the role of class struggle in the functioning of the laws of capitalist production.

Postone’s re-interpretation of Marx marginalizes the relation between class struggle and emancipation. Yet, Marx’s profound investment in class struggle’s emancipatory potential can be demonstrated through his elaboration of the concrete forms of working-class self-activity found in the chapter of Capital, “The Working Day” (Marx, 1990, 415). Here, Marx examines the interaction between the workers’ movement and the factory inspectors, and the historic combination through which they were able to effect the legal limitation of factory working hours. Furthermore, Marx traces the nascent connections between this movement and emancipatory struggles against slavery and oppression, from which he saw the potential development of a revolutionary challenge to the functioning of the capitalist system. By contrast, for Postone, working-class struggle only serves to constitute the capital relation rather than to challenge it.

Michael Lebowitz has a very different take on class subjectivity from Postone. Nevertheless, for Lebowitz, Postone’s argument is possible because of “a critical silence” in Capital that “permits the appearance that, for the scientist, the only subject (if there is one at all) is capital” (Lebowitz, 2003, 25). Lebowitz’s main contention is that, despite the occasional appearance of class struggle in Capital, Marx does not

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1 I would like to thank Alex Callinicos for his supervision of my work on subjectivity in Capital during the completion of my PhD entitled “The Problem of Subjectivity in Marxism: Karl Marx, Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci” at King’s College London (Jackson, 2013). Thanks are also due to the Science & Society reading collective for their very helpful written feedback, to Stathis Kouvelakis, and to Frédéric Monferrand and Colin Barker for their advice on draft versions of this article.
systematically explore the side of wage-labor, the subjectivity of workers, as he does for the capital side of the capital–wage-labor relation. In *Beyond Capital*, and more recently *Following Marx*, Lebowitz advocates the development of a “political economy of the working class” that might arise from the completion of Marx’s initially planned, but never realized, “Book on Wage-Labor.” While Lebowitz advances a fruitful treatment of the variable nature of human needs, I am unconvinced that this provides the many-sided reading of *Capital* that he desires.

**Criticisms of Postone and Lebowitz**

A number of substantive critiques have already been made of the work of Postone and Lebowitz. For example, there have been symposia on both thinkers in the journal *Historical Materialism*, in which different aspects of their thought have been critically examined from a variety of theoretical standpoints. Thus, Lebowitz has been taken to task for paying insufficient attention to the “levels of analysis” of *Capital* (Albritton, 2003), for homogenizing the divisions within the working class with his concept of “degree of separation” (Fine, 2008; Panitch and Gindin, 2006), and for underestimating the significance of competition for the constitution of capital and failing to lay out a revolutionary theory to match his demand for “revolutionary practice” (Barker, 2006).

Postone’s intervention is widely admired, but has also been criticized for marginalizing the revolutionary capacities of the proletariat (Arthur, 2004; Hudis, 2004), giving an “affirmative” theory of capital-as-subject (Bonefeld, 2004) or a “one-dimensional account of labor” (McNally, 2004), confusing the relationship between the historical and the logical (Albritton, 2004), and advancing an incoherent methodological rejection of transhistorical categories (Fracchia, 2004). While a comprehensive appraisal of the effectivity of these criticisms is beyond the scope of this article, I am indebted to these interventions for many of my arguments.

The current approach is distinguished by its juxtaposition of Postone and Lebowitz. Their frameworks have never, to my knowledge, been treated in tandem. There are good reasons for doing so, since

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2 The symposium on Postone’s *Time, Labour and Social Domination* can be found in *Historical Materialism*, 12:3 (2004), and that on Lebowitz in *Historical Materialism*, 14:2 (2006).

3 Although David McNally has referred to Lebowitz’s work in his discussion of Postone (McNally, 2004, 201).
each exposes certain questions that are beyond the horizon of the other’s thought. They can be read as expressing the potentials and difficulties of re-actualizing in contemporary conditions the approach towards subjectivity in *Capital* pioneered by Georg Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* (hereafter HCC).

Lukács’ work is recognized as one of the most ambitious and yet problematic attempts to address the problem of subjectivity in *Capital*. Aspects of the book remain widely influential, but substantial re-assessment of his overall framework has only infrequently been deemed profitable in recent decades (with notable exceptions, such as Starosta, 2003). This is perhaps understandable, given the contrast between Lukács’ unflinching confidence in the revolutionary capacities of the proletariat and the marked absence of evidence justifying these beliefs in the cycle of defeat and retreat of workers’ organizations in the same period. While a brace of new studies on Lukács’ revolutionary thought can be seen as a counter-tendency to this,4 David McNally has recently argued that the “flourishing of dialectical thought is invariably bound up with moments of mass insurgency” (McNally, 2015, 131).

Nevertheless, I believe that Lebowitz’s and Postone’s stimulating writings can lead us to the conclusion that there are more intellectual resources on offer in Lukács’ work than currently assumed. I will evaluate their key texts through a Lukácsian lens, by arguing that the work of each thinker can be related to one of the twin antinomies within Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness*: his theory of reification and his wager on the revolutionary capacities of the proletariat, respectively. Thus, as Postone readily acknowledges, he is deeply influenced by Lukács’ analysis of the commodity-form as the universal structuring principle of capitalist society in all its spheres (Postone, 1993, 72–3). For his part, Lebowitz retains Lukács’ commitment to the self-emancipation of the working class, albeit without interrogating Lukács’ conception of the working class in its philosophical guise as the “identical subject–object of history” (Lukács, 1971, 197). Postone and Lebowitz deploy this Lukácsian lineage mediated through radically different sets of influences. Postone’s important studies of abstract labor and abstract time represent an attempt to deepen the

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4 See, for example, Burkett, 2013; CCM, 2014; Fracchia, 2013; Grollios, 2014; and Le Blanc, 2013, among others.
foundations of the Frankfurt school tradition in political economy, while Lebowitz’s writings more often engage in a dialog with classical Marxist, neo-Ricardian and analytical Marxist thinkers (e.g., Lebowitz, 1988).

Making Capital

With the publication of the various drafts of Marx’s Capital, the resources for those studying Marx’s critique of political economy continue to expand (see Dussel, 2001). It is significant that the study of Marx’s Grundrisse, the most famous of these drafts, has greatly influenced the interpretations of both Postone and Lebowitz. Not only does the Grundrisse highlight aspects of continuity with Marx’s earlier writings, particularly with respect to the theme of alienation, but it also provides a vantage point from which the development of these themes can be readily grasped in the totality of Marx’s overall project. While we may not go so far as Antonio Negri in his contention that Capital is only a fragment of the larger project of the Grundrisse, in Marx Beyond Marx Negri compellingly foregrounds the Grundrisse as “the summit of Marx’s revolutionary thought” (Negri, 1991, 18). Indeed, some of Negri’s insights, e.g., concerning the relation between revolutionary subjectivity and the working class, “which, in the Grundrisse, is always a concept of crisis and of catastrophe for capital” (Negri, 1991, 5), make for a very productive tension with the work of Postone and Lebowitz.

At the same time, the Grundrisse cannot be treated as either interchangeable with or superseding the published volumes of Capital. We can see from the problems encountered by Marx in the production of Capital that his analytical framework increases in coherence during the process of drafting (see Callinicos, 2014). Nevertheless, one of the strengths of Lebowitz’s and Postone’s analyses is their mobilization of the Grundrisse in order to examine the “essential core” of Marx’s understanding of capitalist society. Their work is therefore very significant, even if I may advance criticisms of the results.

An examination of Postone’s and Lebowitz’s writings in this context helps to determine certain Lukácsian resources that can be reactualized in contemporary conditions. This is not to argue that a treatment of these two thinkers is exhaustive of Lukács’ legacy. In fact, this comparative procedure may also negatively reveal aspects of
Lukács’ work that have been obscured by the subsequent use of his ideas. Indications that the antinomies of his thought remain conceptually productive arise from the contention that both Lebowitz and Postone overlook the intimate relationship between ideological crisis and subjectivity central to Lukács’ revolutionary writings. Indeed, I would suggest that Postone’s and Lebowitz’s works tend to obscure the ruptural moment of *Augenblick*, as the art of seizing the correct moment for an act to intervene within a situation, which is central to rendering a plausible conception of subjectivity in Lukács’ HCC.5

In this respect, it may also be helpful to contrast Postone and Lebowitz with other contemporary thinkers. To give one example, in a review article (Lebowitz, 1998, 174), Lebowitz himself noted the possibility of comparing his conception of “revolutionary practice,” as “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances” and self-change (Lebowitz, 1997, 142), with Negri’s concept of “self-valorization” (Negri, 1991, 162).6 At the same time, while Negri rails against any form of “objectivism” that suffocates revolutionary practice, the effect of Postone’s and Lebowitz’s work is to re-articulate the processual aspect of Lukács’ theory, its law-like basis in political economy. In the light of subsequent historical experiences, this could be a vital supplement to contemporary ruptural theories of revolutionary subjectivity that propose a radical break with the normal routines of existence, such as the political subjectivity that arises from Alain Badiou’s theory of the *Event*.7

**Subjectivity in Capital**

Different conceptions of subjectivity in *Capital* are intimately bound up with the interpretation and articulation of the nature of Marx’s overall project. Lebowitz defines Marx’s project as the creation

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5 Slavoj Žižek discusses Lukács’ concept of *Augenblick* in his *Postface to Tailism and the Dialectic* (Žižek, 2000, 164). Felton Shortall has also engaged in debate with Lebowitz about the absence of a discussion of the relation between subjectivity and crisis within Lebowitz’s thought at a more general level (see Shortall, 2000, 125–4).

6 Negri’s “self-valorization” requires the proletarian subject to sever the connection between wage-labor and the realization of its needs, “to present itself as the activity that regulates universality” (Negri, 1991, 162). A further examination of this relationship would be a valuable study, but is beyond the remit of the current article.

7 For Badiou, a radical break with the current order requires a subject (related to four truth procedures of politics, art, love, and science) that is faithful to the *Event*. Truths are not the effect of a certain order, but require an *Event* which is a “type of rupture that opens up [the possibility of] truths” (Badiou, 2007, xii).
of a “political economy of the working class,” and he demonstrates Marx’s commitment to the proletariat as the potential agent of radical social transformation in Capital in part by drawing on evidence from Marx’s “Inaugural Address” for the First International, a document drafted in 1864, during Marx’s work on Capital (Lebowitz, 2003, 80). By contrast, Postone’s re-interpretation of Marx’s critical theory and the ideological obstacles entailed by the theory of reification lead him to question the “political and social role traditionally accorded [to] the proletariat in the possible historical overcoming of capitalism” (Postone, 1993, 7). Postone characterizes Capital as an “autocritique of capitalist society.” However, the process of realizing this autocritique, and the alternative agencies capable of realizing it — the “social determinations of emancipatory subjectivity” (Starosta, 2004, 46) — are rather opaque in Postone’s work. Nevertheless, the challenges posed by Postone are not easily dismissed, and greatly clarify our understanding of Marx’s key categories.

Both thinkers conceive of Marx’s project as a radical overcoming, even revolutionary transformation, of capitalist society. They seek to confront the historical failures of revolutionary movements and the legacy of “actually-existing socialism” by returning to the “silences” or mis-interpretations of Marx’s texts. For Lebowitz, this is motivated by a desire to explain Michael Burawoy’s “two anomalies”: “the durability of capitalism and the passivity of the working class” (Lebowitz, 1997, 134). I argue that both thinkers, while ultimately falling short of this aim, make substantial contributions to addressing this challenge. I will examine their significant differences on the question of working-class subjectivity, understood, in simplified Sartrean terms, as what the working class are capable of making out of what is made of them.

It is difficult to contest that Marx attributes some agency to workers in their struggle over the length of the working day. The “voice of the worker” arises for the first time in “The Working Day,” where the workers make an apparently spontaneous claim, within the terms of political economy, as a commodity demanding its proper value. Marx quotes historical evidence from a manifesto of striking London building workers (1859–60), and describes the working-class movement as having “grown instinctively out of the relations of production themselves” (Marx, 1990, 415). Does this mean, however, as Postone would suggest, that class struggle is limited to its constitutive role in
the capital relation, or does the struggle arising out of these relations also point beyond them, even if in a non-linear manner?

**Circuit of Capital, Circuit of Wage-Labor**

For Lebowitz, the circuit of capital (M–C–M’) is constantly challenged by a countervailing circuit of the reproduction of labor-power (C–M–C) that always partially evades the control of capital. As Albritton has argued, “since capital only achieves totality at the level of pure capitalism, its grasp on our history is always partial” (Albritton, 2004, 81). If this circuit of capital is guided by the logic of capital, then the counter-circuit of the reproduction of labor-power can be said to have its own alternative logic (Lebowitz, 2003, 81). Thus, Marx hailed the passing of the Factory Acts, the limitation of the working day, as also the “victory of a principle” of the political economy of the working class over the “blind rule of the supply and demand laws” (*ibid.*). For Lebowitz, such a victory entails workers consciously reshaping their needs, and in turn altering the basis on which their needs are produced.

Classical political economy hypostatizes the needs of workers at any given moment and reduces them to a given *datum*, the socially necessary minimum value required to reproduce the workers’ labor-power. By contrast, Lebowitz argues that the “political economy of the working class” would overcome the reduction of producers as human beings to their element as wage-earner, by exploring the potential for variable human needs arising from class struggle. Thus, Lebowitz suggests that “it is because workers are not merely wage-laborers but are human beings that there is a tendency to drive beyond wage-labor” (Lebowitz, 2003, 207).

There is, however, a flip side to the coin. As Lebowitz himself notes, “each new need becomes a new link in the golden chain that secures workers to capital” (Lebowitz, 2003, 39). But Lebowitz does not drill to the theoretical core of this insight. His valorization of the self-transcendence of wage-labor tends to confirm the stereotype that Postone refers to as “traditional” Marxism. For Postone, industrial production based on proletarian labor is itself responsible for the alienated social relations under capitalism. Lebowitz’s silence with regard to Lukács’ theory of reification suggests that Postone’s theory of social mediation might be an important contribution towards delivering
the many-sided theory of Marxism sought by Lebowitz. For Postone, this must include an adequate critical theory of the constitution of determinate socio-historical forms of subjectivity.

For Lebowitz, the division of the workers’ day into free time and labor time is key: capitalism provides the basis for the universal expansion of free time. Thus, he says that “superfluous or disposable time is potentially the basis for free human activity, that activity which is ‘not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty’” (Lebowitz, 2009, 26). Insofar as the expansion of workers’ free time is the goal of class struggle, Lebowitz’s conception of “revolutionary practice” is greatly divergent from the “self-valorization” of the working class endorsed by Negri. For Negri, “capital has subjugated all of lived time, not only that of the working day, but all, all of it” (Negri, 1991, xvi). Between Postone and Lebowitz, as inheritors of Lukács’ thought, it is Postone who theorizes the way in which not only the time of labor but also free time under capitalism takes on an alienated form.

Although Lebowitz explicitly rejects the notion of an eternal human nature (Lebowitz, 2003, 33), he contends that “the foundation for real social labor and for the evolution of full human potential” is our capacity for “free activity — true human wealth,” carried out “as an end in itself” (Lebowitz, 2009, 26). Albritton makes sharp criticisms of Lebowitz’s “unquestioning embrace of humanist essentialism,” suggesting that this blinds Lebowitz to the most creative and dynamic developments in recent thought that emphasize the social construction of subjectivity (Albritton, 2003, 106). Thus, Lebowitz’s conception of the realization of the human quality of the “inner laws of wage-labor” could leave him vulnerable to Louis Althusser’s critique of theoretical humanism.8 Lebowitz might reject such criticisms, yet his framework certainly tends to overlook the element of silent conditioning of forms of consciousness that takes place under capitalist social relations.

Despite this, we should not be too hasty to jettison Lebowitz’s endorsement of the emancipatory potential of the labor movement.

8 Althusser rejects the role given to an essential human nature as the subject of history (see Althusser, 2005, 229–31). Of interest here is Postone’s contention that Lukács and Althusser constitute one-sided opposites, where the former identifies Hegel’s Geist with the proletariat; the latter hypostatizes a historically specific set of social relations (Postone, 1993, 77, fn. 95).
In an early review article of Postone’s TLSD, Andrew Feenberg questioned Postone’s equation of “proletarian revolution” with “a return to itself of a transhistorical subject,” to “the human essence embodied as labor . . . alienated by capitalism” (Feenberg, 1996, 610). As Feenberg points out, many variants of classical Marxism have evaded the theoretical trap that Postone ascribes to all “traditional” Marxism. Along with Feenberg, and contrary to Postone’s view, we might argue that the framework developed by Lukács in HCC is one such candidate.

My contention is that thinking through Postone’s and Lebowitz’s theoretical contributions in tandem creates a problematic very similar to the dilemma at the heart of Lukács’ thought. It is possible therefore to make a return to Lukácsian themes in contemporary conditions, initiating a more open re-reading, “against the grain,” of HCC than the commonly accepted codification of its framework. However, this exercise also highlights the absence in Lebowitz’s and Postone’s work of what I will argue is one of the central innovations in Lukács’ thought: the role of ideological crisis in the development of working-class subjectivity.

Capital and Class Struggle

Marx is committed to a concrete analysis of the effects of working-class struggle on the functioning of capitalism. However, does Capital allow an understanding of the means by which the proletariat — as victims of capital integrated into its monstrous machinery — might take control of this organism and overthrow it? Lebowitz frequently reminds us that Marx sought to advance a scientific study of capital in order that the working class would inscribe on their banners the slogan: “the abolition of the wages system.”

Lukács’ contemporary, the philosopher Karl Korsch, argued that “the revolutionary will is latent, yet present, in every sentence of Marx’s work” (Korsch, 1970, 60). Yet, even when Marx’s project reaches its highest level of determination in Volume III, the absence of the character of the working-class revolutionary, or indeed, a theory of revolutionary politics and organization, is obvious in the text. The heroic figures of the class struggle depicted in Capital are more often the factory inspectors, who appear to enable social change through their “competent” and “unpartisan” exposure of the truth about the conditions of factory exploitation.
Lebowitz’s position is therefore predicated on explaining the “silences” in *Capital*, arising from the assumption by political economy of the fixed needs of the working class. For Lebowitz, identifying the relation between workers’ agency within capitalism and its transcendence of the boundaries of the capital relation requires a return to Marx’s definition, in the *Communist Manifesto*, of “revolutionary practice.” In these terms, Lebowitz’s emphasis on human praxis reformulates needs in an expansive sense, seeking to transcend the counterposition of struggles against exploitation and oppression (Lebowitz, 2003, 186).

Lebowitz has been praised for his attempts to overcome the schism between Marxism and wider struggles against oppression. He contends that the missing book on wage-labor accounts for the perceived deficit of Marxism with relation to feminism, although Albritton has questioned how effectively this will influence those not already convinced of Lebowitz’s position (Albritton, 2003, 106). Further, Lebowitz has been criticized for viewing these struggles solely through the prism of “wage-labor struggles” without theorizing the broader “social constitution of capital” (Bonefeld, 2006). Here we might again argue that Postone provides a necessary corrective to Lebowitz, since the former’s project to reconstruct Marx’s categories is intended to create a critical theory of this wider social constitution.

At the same time, Lebowitz’s efforts to re-focus attention on class struggle exposes a reciprocal difficulty for Postone. Throughout *Capital*, Marx is concerned to demonstrate the intimate relation between the capital relation and the class relation (e.g., Marx, 1992, 115). The intertwining of these relations conflicts with Postone’s interpretation. The latter argues coherently that capitalism’s fundamental contradictions “should not be identified immediately” with “concrete social relations . . . such as those of class struggle” (Postone, 1993, 34). However, this does not imply that class struggle has no mediated relation whatsoever to this fundamental contradiction.

While Postone acknowledges the presence of class struggle in *Capital*, he delimits its character as “structurally intrinsic to capitalism,” and in no way pointing to emancipatory possibilities beyond it.

9 Colin Barker is also critical of Lebowitz’s account of sex, gender and class. He takes issue with Lebowitz’s treatment of household relations as relations of slavery, questioning whether Lebowitz’s account is capable of negotiating the complexities of the working-class family and its various forms, and the manifold struggles arising from this (Barker, 2006, 73).
He clearly elaborates the aspect of workers’ struggles as a “constitutive element of the dynamic of [the] system” (Postone, 1993, 35–6), but is less convincing when suggesting that Marx had only this aspect in mind. For Postone, the effects of working-class struggle on the functioning of capitalism described in “The Working Day” only serve to constitute the capital relation and in no way to challenge it.

It is true that, according to Capital, the Factory Acts, which seek to protect the conditions of workers’ lives, tend to increase the speed at which the development of large-scale industry reduces workers to the level of objects within the labor process. However, the capital relation, which structurally tends to produce a “collective worker” driven into increasingly socialized forms of organization in the labor process, for Marx, also increasingly creates the potentiality for collective struggle (Marx, 1990, 468, 544). It is for this reason that Marx envisages the passing of these laws as the first staging post in the intervention of the working-class movement, and the “preliminary condition” of its further emancipation (Marx, 1990, 415).

Capital and Revolution

We have the evidence of Marx’s own explanation in his Postface to the Second Edition of Capital, that his critique of political economy aims to represent “the class whose historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes — the proletariat” (Marx, 1990, 98). Such a perspective helps to explain that Marx’s concern for the “meager concession rung from capital,” in the form of the Factory Acts, is in fact a prelude to the “conquest of political power by the working class” (Marx, 1990, 619). It is to the “revolt of the working class” that Marx looks for the death “knell of capitalist private property” and the potential expropriation of the expropriators (Marx, 1990, 929).

It is more difficult to discover in what sense this rousing finale to Volume I of Capital is organically rooted in the categories that have emerged throughout Marx’s analysis. As Colin Barker points out, “the lesson Marx drew from the Ten Hours movement was that, since in economic terms capital is always stronger than labor, a political class movement is needed” (Barker, 2006, 68). It is from this perspective that Lebowitz’s conception of a clash between bourgeois political economy and a “political economy of the working class” makes sense.
That Marx accorded fundamental importance to the emergence of the working class as a class subject is further evidenced by his *Letter to Bolte* of November 23, 1871 (ME, 1968). Here, Marx distinguishes between an economic movement, such as the struggle within a particular factory for a shortening of the working day, and a political movement, the attempt to pass a general law limiting the working day. Marx argues that a political movement grows out of the separate economic movements of the proletariat as “a movement of the class, with the object of achieving its interests in a general form, in a form possessing a general social force of compulsion” (ME, 1968).

While Postone is correct to draw our attention to the critique of labor in *Capital*, I would argue that his concern to immunize critical theory against the dangers of “traditional” Marxism (and its degeneration into “actually-existing socialism”) tends to obscure a serious examination of the potential connection between an immanent critique of capitalist society, which he advocates, and its location in what Chris Arthur calls the “critically adopted standpoint of labor” (Arthur, 2004, 101). Can a critical theory of social mediations, such as Postone’s, be elaborated without foreclosing the possibility of a class-based analysis that points beyond the limits of capitalist society? Albritton suggests that capital-centered and class-centered approaches need not be irreconcilably opposed (Albritton, 2004, 79). Yet, the scale of this task is indicated by numerous unresolved difficulties with elaborating such a conception. Is it possible to mediate between the terms of evasion and capture that characterize the relation of working-class subjectivity to the logic of capital? Can adequate evaluative criteria be identified for distinguishing between a critique of bourgeois political economy and the “political economy of the working class” proposed and highlighted by Lebowitz? (Lebowitz, 2003, ix).

*The Influence of Lukács on Lebowitz and Postone*

It is now possible to examine the nature of the influence exerted by Lukács on Lebowitz’s and Postone’s interpretations of *Capital*. Lebowitz refers to Lukács primarily as a methodological guide, citing most frequently his claim that “orthodoxy refers exclusively to method”

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10 The recent experience of the Paris Commune had no doubt placed the question of state power, a topic that cannot be dealt with here but implied in this remark, prominently in Marx’s thought.
This axiomatic scepticism towards the “sacred” status of Marx’s key works underpins Lebowitz’s central claim that an authentic completion of *Capital* is possible, indeed necessary. By contrast, Postone claims to have uncovered the true nature of Marx’s critique, against “traditional” Marxist interpretations, including that of Lukács — the virtues of his work notwithstanding. At the same time, Lebowitz proposes that his “completion” of Marx’s project is an “integral development” from within its “structures of thought,” invoking Antonio Gramsci’s notion of the “self-sufficiency of Marxism” as opposed to a grafting of alien elements onto the body of Marx’s thought (Lebowitz, 2003, 26).

Lebowitz adopts the distinctively Lukácsian determination of the Marxist method that emphasizes Marx’s appropriation of the category of totality from Hegel (Lebowitz, 2003, 53). The essence of Marx’s method, according to Lukács, is the “all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts,” and, consequently, the primacy of the category of totality is the “bearer of the principle of revolution in science” (Lukács, 1971, 27). Lebowitz therefore follows Lukács in his tendency to reject the approach of moving from the parts to the whole as being inherently characteristic of “bourgeois thought” (Lebowitz, 2003, 53).11

Lebowitz and Postone grapple in different ways with the difficulties arising from Lukács’ focus on the centrality of the category of totality. For Postone, Marx’s position “differs fundamentally” from Lukács’, since the latter “views totality affirmatively, as the standpoint of critique, and identifies Hegel’s identical subject–object with the proletariat” (Postone, 1993, 74). Postone attributes to Lukács a materialist appropriation of Hegel, in contrast to the historical critique made by Marx. This assimilation of Lukács’ position to a simple substitution of the proletariat for the Hegelian absolute is a commonly held assumption. I will argue later that this is a point of contention, since the practical element of workers’ consciousness re-shuffles the matrix of Hegelian thought.12

To my knowledge, Lebowitz has not clarified his own position concerning the philosophical difficulties of Lukács’ conception of

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11 Lebowitz bases his extensive critique of the “methodological individualism” of Analytical Marxism on this tenet (Lebowitz, 2009, 47).

12 Another objection is drawn to our attention by Jameson, who characterizes the identical subject–object as a merely “local thematic climax” of Lukács’ engagement with German Idealism in HCC (Jameson, 2009, 217).
the proletariat as the absolute subject–object of history. This is curious, given the issue’s clear relevance to Lebowitz’s antipathy towards the idea of an “Abstract Proletarian,” “the mere negation of capital” (Lebowitz, 2003, 138). Nevertheless, Bonefeld argues that Lebowitz has misinterpreted Marx’s critique of capital in seeing the “negation of the negation” as arriving at “new levels of synthesis: the worker-for-self as a pseudo-absolute of the ‘workers’ state’” (Bonefeld, 2006, 88).

The same cannot be said of Postone, who relentlessly pursues the problematic consequences of adopting a standpoint implicitly or explicitly founded on the generation of the social totality from a transhistorical conception of labor. For Postone, the social totality already exists and it is the object of Marx’s critique. An emancipatory moment is available not through the realization, but only through the abolition of this capitalist totality. Marx’s critique therefore investigates “the unfolding of [the] dialectical logic [of capital] as a real expression of alienated social relations which are constituted by practice and, yet, exist quasi-independently” (Postone, 1993, 76).

Despite ultimately rejecting Lukács’ adherence to the standpoint of the proletariat, Postone characterizes Lukács’ contribution, and the subsequent contribution of the Frankfurt school, as having pointed beyond “traditional” Marxism towards a “sophisticated” understanding of Marx’s critical theory as a critique of transhistorical categories (Postone, 1993, 15). This is not merely a critique of material production or class structure, but a “theory of the historical constitution of determinate, reified forms of social objectivity and subjectivity” (Postone, 1993, 15). Thus, as I have suggested above, Postone and Lebowitz develop the internal tensions of Lukács’ thought along divergent trajectories: the wager on the proletariat as a “political economy of the working class” by Lebowitz, and Postone’s critical theory of social mediations as a theory of reification in “post-liberal” capitalism.

This is not to say that there cannot be what Gramsci would call a “reciprocal translatability” between these two approaches (Gramsci, 1971, 403). This is particularly true if critical theory is to locate a path towards emancipation that retains its anchorage in a class-centered critique of political economy. Or *vice versa*, if this critical standpoint of labor is not to vulgarize its relation to the ideologico-critical elements of its historical development, rendering it capable of a full political engagement within the cultural sphere. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish carefully the different objects of investigation for Lebowitz
Lebowitz and Postone. Lebowitz aims to expose the “inner laws of capital” in their struggle with the “inner laws of wage-labor” (Lebowitz, 2003, 81, 84), while Postone re-interprets Marx’s categories as a historically specific theory of social mediation revealing the “essential core of capitalism” (Postone, 1993, 21).

Despite their opposed positions on many issues, Postone and Lebowitz share a common focus on the unitary nature of the social totality. The origins of this tendency can be located in Lukács’ emphasis on the proletariat’s historic potential under capitalism of grasping the unity of the economic process. Postone and Lebowitz express this unity in radically different ways. Postone’s account of capital without consciousness, as a system of abstract, impersonal domination, is for Callinicos “quite close to Althusser’s conception of a decentered totality and of history as a process without a subject” (Callinicos, 2014, 219).13 By contrast, Barker argues that Lebowitz’s treatment of “capital as ‘one’” leads him to understate the significance of competition in the constitution of capitalist society (Barker, 2006, 78). This appears primarily with respect to Lebowitz’s confidence that competition is merely the surface expression of the inner nature of capital, and his consequent reduction of the capital relation to its inner connections.

Cooperation and Competition

For Lebowitz, the inner connections of the capital relation “reduce the visible and merely apparent movement to the actual inner movement” (Lebowitz, 2009, 85). Lebowitz’s interpretation of *Capital* is dominated, Barker argues, by the “vertical” relations between wage-labor and capital, and consequently overlooks the “horizontal” relations between commodity producers and capitals (Barker, 2006, 78). For Barker, the absence of a satisfactory treatment of competition means that capital’s “dynamic impulses and its tendencies to crisis are all incomprehensible,” as are its “self-mystifying characteristics,” such as “those arising from the monetary system” (Barker, 2006, 78). This makes it difficult for Lebowitz to understand the motivation of capital’s drive for endless accumulation, and to provide a basis for explaining the “political capacities of the capitalist class” (Barker, 2006, 78).

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13 While Postone’s study of the alienated forms of social mediation is in many respects quite antithetical to Althusser’s framework, e.g., the intimate relation of these forms with the directionality of history, this affinity merits further investigation.
It could be said that Lebowitz’s framework both understates and overstates competition. It is understated, since Lebowitz classifies it as a mere appearance or epiphenomenon. At the same time, it is also overstated, since Lebowitz argues that the negation of competition is the key to overcoming the capitalist mode of production. It is tempting to say that he cannot have it both ways. Albritton argues that, for Lebowitz, “competition” is “the catch-all for all economic relations that cannot be theorized at the level of capital’s inner logic” (Albritton, 2003, 97). This leads to a conflation of various different phenomena: those central to the existence of capital, those at the level of heterogeneous capitals (Volume III), and those exceeding the inner laws of capital.

Whatever these limitations, we could say that Lebowitz’s outstanding contribution lies in his dogged insistence that the tendencies of capital’s self-development must always be considered in their antagonistic conflict with wage-labor. As a corollary, when theorizing class forces in struggle, it may not be possible to draw a clear and distinct separation between “commodity-economic” and “extra-economic” elements. At the concrete historical level, Lebowitz draws our attention to Marx’s enthusiasm for mass working-class experiments with cooperative forms. Yet, as Marx also pointed out in his “Inaugural Address” to the First International, these experiments are consistently subordinated to the logic of capital.

On his part, Postone would see Lebowitz’s intention to negate competition as insufficient, and his aim to realize the inner laws of wage-labor as positively dangerous. For Postone, treating “labor” as the “constituting substance of a Subject” leads to the re-creation of a “collective version of the bourgeois subject” (Postone, 1993, 78). Thus, proletarian labor and the industrial process of production are simply expressions of domination and not means of human emancipation. The success of the strategy of “traditional” Marxism can lead only to the “full realization of capital as a quasi-concrete totality rather than to its abolition” (Postone, 1993, 83). The standpoint of labor is therefore inherently problematic, and prone towards creating a bureaucratic state-capitalist regime of the type found under “actually-existing socialism.”

Given the seemingly irreconcilable antagonism between the heterogeneous elements of Lukács’ framework developed by Lebowitz and Postone, what is the possibility of re-actualizing his thought in contemporary conditions? Postone argues that “Marx’s historical critique of Hegel” is fatally undermined by Lukács’ “materialist appropriation of Hegel” (Postone, 1993, 74), but this seems to assimilate Lukács to an impoverished inversion of Hegelian idealism. More sympathetic readers of Lukács, such as Fredric Jameson, seek to displace any ascription to him (or Hegel) of a mechanical synthesis of subject and object. Jameson’s *Valences of the Dialectic* aims to restore the unpredictability of Lukács’ dialectic, and the “unsuspected dimensions of the problem — interrelationship and process” (Jameson, 2009, 205). Certainly, this requires questioning the easy identification of Lukács’ “aspiration towards totality” with a necessary slide into totalitarianism (Lukács, 1971, 174, 198).

It is easy to see how Jameson’s reading of Lukács, which draws on poststructuralist themes, might not appeal to Postone. According to Žižek, Postone is at his best when critiquing the formalism of “production,” by demonstrating that “the standpoint of the capitalist concrete historical ‘totality’ is missed by theories which try to capture the determining feature of our world with notions like ‘risk’ or ‘indeterminacy’” (Žižek, 2010, 195–6). In Žižek’s view, Postone demonstrates that “the experience of contingency or indeterminacy as a fundamental feature of our lives is the very form of capitalist domination, the social effect of the global rule of capital” (Žižek, 2010, 196).

Postone reads the ontologizing of historical indeterminacy by poststructuralist thought in its relation to “traditional” Marxism (Postone, 1993, 80). According to Postone, poststructuralism over-reacts to “traditional” Marxism’s affirmation of an emancipatory totality by tranhistorically denying the very existence of a social totality. For Postone, an adequate critical theory of the present must move beyond the one-sidedness of both “traditional” Marxism and poststructuralism through an auto-critique of “the alienated structure of social mediation that constitutes the capitalist formation” (Postone, 1993, 81).

While we might agree with Postone that there is “no linear continuum” between the “demands and conceptions of the working class,” and the “needs, demands, and conceptions that point beyond
capitalism,” this does not imply that there is no connection whatsoever (Postone, 1993, 37). Lebowitz unfortunately plays into the hands of this critique by underestimating many of the (often silent) obstacles to social mediation between the formation of trade unions, a workers’ state and the creation of a socialist society (Lebowitz, 2003, 196). The reverse of the medal is that Postone’s marginalization of the emancipatory potential of labor leaves a nebulous basis for the transcendence of capitalist society. Indeed, Postone tantalizingly declines to elaborate on the consequences of his re-interpretation of Marx’s thought for the question of the possible forms of post-capitalist society (Postone, 1993, 40, fn. 55).

It is in this context that I would argue that Lukács’ ambitious confrontation with the ideological problems of overcoming capitalism is still relevant today. Lebowitz and Postone each provide us with partial tools to reconstruct the relationship between, on the one hand, the development of emancipatory class subjectivity and, on the other, the process of generating the social mediations necessary to penetrate the reified immediacy of capitalist society. Lukács demonstrates an awareness of the yawning chasm between the possibility of class consciousness and the process by which that might become a reality, but his proposed solution may not be as simple as the romantically messianic act of a super-subject that is frequently ascribed to him.

Crisis and Subjectivity

Lukács’ essays in HCC are suffused with the concept of crisis. He distinguishes between the objective, economic “world crisis” and the subjective, ideological crisis of the proletariat (Lukács, 1971, 310–11). The relationship between these subjective and objective crises is of particular importance for the proletariat, since the latter’s very existence is defined by crisis: “The proletariat is . . . at one and the same time the product of the permanent crisis in capitalism and the instrument of those tendencies which drive capitalism towards crisis” (Lukács, 1971, 40). Moreover, he regards the failure to distinguish between ideological and objective forms of crisis as a hallmark of fatalistic and “economistic” theory, since there “is simply no room for the idea of an ideological crisis of the proletariat in which proletarian ideology lags behind the economic crisis” (Lukács, 1971, 305).
Lukács’ examination of the intimate relationship between ideological crisis and subjectivity is conspicuously missing among the elements of his thought that have influenced contemporary thinkers such as Postone and Lebowitz. Postone’s account of the transformation of forms of consciousness, despite its emphasis on non-linearity, does not address the ruptural aspect of the “leaps” that Lukács made central to the coherence of his notion of class-consciousness. Lebowitz exhibits a similar relative theoretical disinterest in the concept of ideological crisis. Towards the end of Beyond Capital, he remarks that crises “merely offer an opportunity to identify the essence of capital” (Lebowitz, 2003, 167). I would argue that much is at stake for Lebowitz’s project in this “mere opportunity.”

Lebowitz shares Lukács’ hostility towards economic determinism, and cites Lukács to this effect: “History is at its least automatic when it is the consciousness of the proletariat that is at issue” (Lebowitz, 2003, 171; Lukács, 1971, 208). Lebowitz seeks to redress one-sided Marxist theories of crisis, stressing that the “one important message” from Beyond Capital is “that economic crises do not bring about an end to capitalism” (Lebowitz, 2003, xi). According to Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, this is one of the book’s main achievements: a “rich clarification of the limitations of Marxist crisis theory, based on a crucial distinction between the concepts of ‘barriers’ and ‘limits!’” (PG, 2006, 120).

Lebowitz sees the proletariat as the true limit of capital. He defines workers’ subjectivity as their capacity to become responsible for the development of their own needs. The difficulty is that Lebowitz rarely discusses the issue of consciousness outside of quotation marks, and consequently overlooks the significance of ideological crisis in the development of workers’ subjectivity. Lebowitz proposes the necessity of theory, a “political economy of the working class,” in order to resolve the economic crisis posed by capitalism. Yet, he maintains a theoretical silence on the role that ideological crises might play in the transformation of this theory into practical consciousness.

By contrast, Lukács’ theory of class consciousness seeks to account for the proletariat’s capacity for making “leaps” in consciousness without severing its basis in political economy. By maintaining this basis, Lukács recognizes the ability of capital continually to re-assert its dominion, and the possibility that the proletariat might be forced to “start over” at any point, to be subjected to the school of history’s “terrible detours” (Lukács, 1971, 76). For Lukács, the ideological
crisis of the proletariat manifests itself on the one hand “in the fact that the objectively extremely precarious position of bourgeois society is endowed, in the minds of the workers, with all its erstwhile stability,” and on the other hand through the institutionalization of the “bourgeoisification of the proletariat” in reformist workers’ parties and bureaucratized trade unions (Lukács, 1971, 310). Despite these formidable obstacles, Lukács asserts that the “world crisis” opens up the “objective possibility” for the proletariat to grasp the “unity of the economic process” (Lukács, 1971, 75).

Lukács’ polarized conception of subjectivity is distinctive in that the crisis of capitalist society seems to be both permanent and exceptional. In other words, its exceptionality is an immanent feature. His theory of reification expresses the idea that the structure of a crisis is not qualitatively different from that of the “daily life of bourgeois society,” but is rather the peak of its intensity (Lukács, 1971, 101). Indeed, for Lukács, it is vital that force is not something extra-economic, asserted by class actors outside of the commodity-economic process, but is inherent in the everyday functioning of capitalist society. It seems that Lukács subverts normality into a constant state of instability, in order to account for the changing function of the “economic” in a revolutionary process.15

We can see how this aspect of Lukács’ thought addresses the theme of exceptionality that has been taken up in rather a different fashion by Negri and the autonomist tradition. In contrast to Negri, Lukács does not seem to believe that this exceptional situation entails an absolute suspension of the law of value. For Lukács, the relative suspension of the law of value in an economic crisis requires a leap that is also a process: “And it is just as vital to keep in mind the fact that it is a leap as that it is a process” (Lukács, 1971, 252).

Why Should Lebowitz and Postone Care about Lukács?

This exercise may appear to be of questionable validity, as a type of retrospective imposition of a Lukácsian framework onto Postone and

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15 The permanent instability of social existence under capitalism described by Lukács is reminiscent of Simon Clarke’s rendering of Marx as an early theorist of the post-modern condition (Clarke, 1994, 285). Callinicos is critical of this maneuver (Callinicos, 2014, 236), although Clarke’s argument might be more plausibly transposed onto Lukács. Lukács’ normality/exception couple can be situated in Marx’s identification of the formal possibility of crisis in Capital in the separation of purchase and sale, but perhaps not in the disruption of money’s function as a means of payment (see Callinicos, 2014, 246).
Lebowitz. These two thinkers should be praised for their willingness to contravene the accepted conventions of interpreting Marx in favor of rendering his thought relevant to the challenges of the present conjuncture. There are indeed difficulties associated with re-introducing the intimate relation between ideological crisis and subjectivity to the thought of Lebowitz and Postone. Perhaps David McNally would warn of the dangers of offering an “external criticism” of Postone’s project, given that Postone’s direct engagement is more properly with the later Frankfurt school than with Lukács himself (McNally, 2004, 206). There is much to recommend in an immanent method of critique; however, I would suggest that the juxtaposition of Postone and Lebowitz helps to place into perspective the radically heterogeneous influence exerted on them by Lukács’ thought. Consequently, an internal critique of each thinker individually might not have sufficiently foregrounded the absence of the problematic of crisis and subjectivity.

Lebowitz is not a Lukácsian in the sense of tracing the proletariat as a philosophical solution to the problems of classical German philosophy, but neither is this the whole story when it comes to Lukács himself, as Jameson has indicated (Jameson, 2009, 217). For Lebowitz, moving beyond capitalism requires that workers gain the capacity to end “capital’s mediation of the development of their needs” (PG, 2006, 120).16 According to Panitch and Gindin, Lebowitz’s great strength is his refusal to rely on an “Abstract Proletarian” to short-cut this complex process. Yet, he evades some difficult issues related to the theory of reification. Al Campbell and Mehmet Ufuk Tutan argue that Lebowitz does indeed sidestep the problems of capital’s systematic self-mystification, and of “false” needs relevant to the realization of socialist decision-making processes (CT, 2006, 104).

For Postone, the issues above cannot be addressed without an adequate critical theory of the alienated social mediations that give rise to determinate forms of consciousness. Postone’s marginalization of the emancipatory potential of workers belies the fecundity of his work for re-conceptualizing Lukács’ wager on the proletariat in terms that have contemporary significance. One example of this is Postone’s examination of the social constitution of two forms of time under capitalism. He defines the first, abstract time, as “homogeneous,

16 This is redolent of the path taken by Agnes Heller, one of Lukács’ own students (see Heller, 1978).
‘empty’ time,” in a manner that echoes Walter Benjamin’s theses in *On the Concept of History* (Postone, 1993, 202). Against this, Postone counterposes a notion of concrete historical time, which is understood as a “movement of time, as opposed to the movement in time” (Postone, 1993, 294).

Unlike Benjamin’s concept of “now-time,” Postone’s historical time is not a revolutionary irruption that blows open the continuum of abstract time.¹⁷ For Postone, there is an intrinsic connection between the social domination of abstract time and an “ongoing, automatic historical flow” (Postone, 1993, 295). In other words, both forms of time are expressions of alienated relations that “remain entirely within the framework of capitalist relations” (Postone, 1993, 295). However, Postone does imply that grasping these two dialectical moments of social reality simultaneously, while difficult, would enable us to penetrate the veil masking “the possibility of a future qualitatively different from modern society” (Postone, 1993, 301). This possibility, “that production based on historical time can be constituted separately from production based on abstract present time,” could, if realized, overcome the alienated interaction between past and present under capitalism (Postone, 1993, 301).

While Postone, Benjamin and Lukács all share a belief in emancipatory possibility, Postone does not seem to consider the option that grasping these dialectical moments of social reality might involve a moment of rupture. This is a constitutive element of Lukács’ notion of the proletariat’s “aspiration towards totality” (Lukács, 1971, 175). By subsuming the act of emancipation into the process of auto-critique, Postone sidelines the crystallization of the redemptive moment that Benjamin vividly articulates through the image: “setting alight the sparks of hope from the past.”

Postone convincingly argues that the non-linearity of the needs and conceptions of labor and the needs and conceptions that point beyond capitalism could “shed new light on Marx’s notion of the self-abolition of the proletariat” (Postone, 1993, 37). I would argue that realizing this potential requires a confrontation with the ruptural element central to both Lukács’ and Benjamin’s conceptions of history. At the same time, Postone’s rich account of different temporalities,

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¹⁷ Alternatively, Heidegger’s distinction between *kairos*, a qualitatively revolutionary time, and *chronos*, linear sequential time, could provide another conceptual lens through which to view this issue (Ó Murchadha, 2013).
in particular his rigorous attention to their basis in the categories of political economy, is a fruitful source for studying the relationship between ruptural conceptions of subjectivity and ideological crisis.\textsuperscript{18}

It is uncertain whether Postone’s self-reflexive social critique, which frames itself in terms of processual transformations of subjectivity, could organically incorporate the ruptural aspect of the leaps in consciousness associated with ideological crisis in Lukács’ HCC. I would suggest that an adequate Marxist theory of the transformation of subjectivity must grasp the unity between two different registers, the processual and the ruptural. Nevertheless, Postone’s conception of the “shearing effect” of contradictions (which do not produce a strict teleology, but help to overcome the gap between the actual and the possible) could assist in a productive re-thinking of Lukács’ proletariat, since “it is itself nothing but the contradictions of history that have become conscious” (Lukács, 1971, 179). As Albritton indicates, “the contradictions produce a pressure towards, and a possibility for, emancipatory change but do not guarantee it” (Albritton, 2004, 74).

Postone’s emphasis on the possibility of an oppositional consciousness is in marked contrast to the fundamental cleavage between capitalist and worker found in the antagonistic constitution of Negri’s framework. It is rather Lebowitz’s notion of revolutionary practice that bears greater resemblance to Negri’s principle of constitution, the constitution “of a new situation which must be resubmitted to the criterion of practice and to the principle of transformation” (Negri, 1991, 56). Significantly, for Negri, it is this principle which “carries crisis to the very heart of Marxist analysis” (Negri, 1991, 56–7).

\textit{Which Lukács?}

Postone, and even the later Lukács himself, have been critical of HCC for appropriating the matrix of Hegel’s dialectic, in Žižek’s words, as “the mystified form of the revolutionary process of emancipatory liberation” (Žižek, 2010, 219). For Postone, Lukács initiates a promising critical theory of reification, but undermines this by mechanically replacing the Hegelian Absolute Spirit with the proletariat as the identical subject–object of history. Without wanting to

\textsuperscript{18} The non-linear and ruptural aspects of Lukács’ thought indicated in this article could be further explored in the light of recent studies of the different temporalities of class struggle in Marx (Tomba, 2013; Tombazos, 2014).
obviate the evident difficulties facing the role ascribed to the proletariat in Lukács’ framework, I would argue that the wholesale rejection of this aspect of his thinking is premature. The “eminently practical nature” of the consciousness of the proletariat should be regarded at minimum as having significantly re-shuffled this Hegelian matrix (Lukács, 1971, 199), or, more strongly, as subjecting it to a radical qualitative transformation.

While an emphasis on “the practical” is not proof against the complex of problems formulated by German Idealism, as Lukács himself testifies (Lukács, 1971, 123),19 Lukács’ persistent valorization of figures other than Hegel suggests that we should re-examine the accepted narrative that his Marxism depicts a straightforward linear progression within philosophy culminating in Hegel, which is then subsequently “materially appropriated.” We might rather conceive the primary figures of German Idealism in Lukács’ Reification essay (Kant, Fichte, Schiller and Hegel) as being each indispensable, and quasi-autonomous, moments in determining his project to overcome the stultifying effects of the commodity-form in capitalist society.

Lukács’ oft-dismissed notion of the proletariat as the identical subject–object of history thus draws on the contribution of each of these four thinkers, relating respectively to the cognitive subject, practical activity, aesthetic totality, and history. The key moments of German Idealism are not simply superseded by Hegel in a linear fashion,20 but are ongoing and critical modes of generating a mediated consciousness to destabilize what Jameson calls “the multiple systemic webs of reification” (Jameson, 2009, 204), the projected unity of the ideological obstacles to overcoming capitalism. Furthermore, Lukács’ engagement with German Idealism passes through an array of contemporary neo-Kantian and phenomenological influences (including Husserl, Lask, Kierkegaard’s “leap,” etc.) that have even yet to be fully explored.

Here, however, Postone rejects, and Lebowitz does not engage with, the full resources offered by the Lukácsian framework. Lukács’ analysis of the notion of objective possibility, and the “leaps” of proletarian class consciousness during periods of crisis prefigure certain

19 Lukács criticizes the philosopher J. G. Fichte for attempting to overcome the schism between subject and object by positing activity as an absolute unity in a manner that merely elevates the problems of German Idealism to a higher level without addressing the concrete nature of this identical subject–object (Lukács, 1971, 123–4).

20 Further analysis of these aspects can be found in Jackson, 2013. It would be of interest to contrast these moments with Badiou’s four truth-procedures: love, politics, art and science.
characteristics of more recent approaches to the question of subjectivity, such as those of Badiou and Žižek. Lukács’ conception of the Augenblick is a re-articulation in philosophical terms of the theory of an intervention in the political moment developed by Lenin. In this notion, we see an attempt dialectically to relate the ruptural and processual approaches to the emergence of a subject. As Žižek has noted, this appears to share some fundamental features with Badiou’s notion of the Event, “an intervention that cannot be accounted for in the terms of its pre-existing ‘objective conditions’” (Badiou, 2007; Žižek, 2000, 164).

Žižek also feels that Postone has marginalized the category of class struggle too hastily, reducing it to a determinist–evolutionary reflection theory of class position. By contrast, Žižek encourages us to look again at the young Lukács’ notion of class struggle as “precisely the transversal which undermines economic determinism,” representing “the dimension of politics at the heart of the economic” (Žižek, 2010, 198). Using the terminology of Heidegger, Žižek suggests that Postone too quickly reduces the dimension of class struggle to “an ontic phenomenon which is secondary with regard to the commodity form” (Žižek, 2010, 198). Yet, the insistence on the processual moment in Postone, and its roots in political economy, is a necessary corrective to the desire for an unproblematic release from the anchoring “law of value.” Lukács’ project can be seen as drawing this processual aspect into tension with Negri’s “definition of the subjectivity of the passage to communism, as a process that develops concomitantly with the crisis of the law of value” (Negri, 1991, xv).

Lukács’ historical situation partially explains the revolutionary optimism inscribed in his conception of the ubiquitous possibility of revolutionary action. For Lukács, revolutionary rupture is immanent in the permanent crisis of the daily life of bourgeois society, the antinomies of which are expressed in his theory of reification. By contrast, Badiou’s fidelity to the events of May 1968 helps to situate the rarity of the Event in his thought. Yet, the radical political egalitarianism of Badiou’s communist project seems at odds with the fundamental role of the exceptional in his thought. This tension may be a symptom of the relative absence of a critique of political economy and its philosophical implications, the under-emphasis on a theory of process, in Badiou’s framework. Could Lukács’ theorization of the exceptional, the permanent crisis that lurks within the normality of
everyday bourgeois life, assist in evading the charge of elitism often leveled against exceptionalist theories?

Conclusion

Reframing the theoretical contributions of Lebowitz and Postone through the conceptual lens of Lukács’ HCC, I have suggested that there is a missing element in these contemporary works influenced by Lukács’ thought, namely the intimate connection between ideological crisis and subjectivity. Reversing the approach, we might ask whether this insight can be assimilated by the thought of Lebowitz and Postone without doing violence to their intellectual frameworks; i.e., whether such an operation would require a qualitative transformation of their work beyond reasonable limits. I have indicated that one of the productive avenues of testing this potential broadening of the frameworks of Lebowitz and Postone is to open a dialog between their respective works and those of contemporary theorists that emphasize the ruptural aspect of subjectivity in order to articulate an emancipatory project to overcome capitalism.

Indeed, no lesser source than Fredric Jameson contends that his own reading of Capital, highly attuned to the intimate connections between crisis and ideology, is “not incompatible” with Lebowitz’s argument for the incompleteness of Capital (Jameson, 2011, 2, fn.2). Denying the incompatibility of the aspects of rupture and process in an adequate contemporary Marxist theory of subjectivity is, however, a weaker condition than articulating a project that affirms their unity. My proposal is that Lukács’ HCC continues to provide unexploited resources for this project precisely because it is one of the most radical attempts to draw these processual and ruptural aspects within a unified framework. Perhaps due to the extreme conditions of its historical genesis, Jameson has proposed that re-reading HCC today requires us, like Benjamin, to brush against the grain of history, or even to see it as a work “yet to be written,” which “lies ahead of us in historical time” (Jameson, 2009, 222).

The dialectical unity of process and rupture in Lukács’ thought is manifested primarily in his conception of a leap, which “can only genuinely preserve its character of a leap if it becomes fully identified with this process [of social change]” (Lukács, 1971, 250). Even if, in the final analysis, one remains unconvinced that the notion of
ideological crisis can shake off the messianic character of the “leaps” ascribed by Lukács to proletarian consciousness, there are under-explored connections with efforts by recent thinkers to investigate the philosophical structure of the exceptional. The well-rehearsed rejection of Lukács’ identical subject–object of the proletariat overlooks the striking affinities of his notion of Augenblick, the moment at which it is possible to act within a situation, with Badiou’s theory of the Event. Lukács has the advantage of drawing closer to providing a philosophy of process that is embedded in the critique of political economy. By extension, through their deep engagement with the categories of political economy, both Lebowitz and Postone bring important rigor to the processual aspects of what Žižek terms “a radical repoliticization of the economy” (Žižek, 1999, 353).

The different obstacles encountered by the respective frameworks of Postone and Lebowitz highlight the difficulties involved with re-actualizing Lukács’ conception of subjectivity in the contemporary conjuncture. I have sought to demonstrate the way in which each thinker develops one arm of the dilemma found in Lukács’ polarized conception of subjectivity: the theory of reification and the wager on the proletariat, respectively. If, for Postone, capital is the subject of Capital, this might lead us to presume that the circuit of capital, the self-augmentation of its value, constitutes from itself the social totality. As David McNally has pointed out however, Postone is too careful a thinker to assume this. Postone recognizes that the majority of people in capitalist society engage in a different circuit, that of wage-labor, whose end is consumption and self-development rather than the endless accumulation of value (McNally, 2004, 201).

Nevertheless, it is Lebowitz, rather than Postone, who draws the most radical conclusions from this insight. Capital is not a self-reproducing totality, but is “dependent on the reproduction of laborers which takes place in and through a circuit it does not control” (McNally, 2004, 201). Lebowitz dedicates himself to elaborating the “political economy of labor” that is inscribed in this circuit of wage-labor. Their work, as McNally points out, helps us to conceive that class struggle must be understood as taking place not only at the level of material production (labor), but simultaneously at the level of the creation of meaning (praxis), in the antagonistic conflict of structures of meaning derived from Marx’s study of the commodity-form (McNally, 2004, 202).
Yet, I would argue that both Lebowitz and Postone overlook the significance of the leap, which, for Lukács, is “nothing more than the conscious meaning of every moment” (Lukács, 1971, 250). It is therefore not a messianic act, but one that must be fully cognizant, after Postone, of the auto-critique of capitalism. In this sense, we should note that Lukács refers to crisis as “the objectification of a self-criticism of capitalism” (Lukács, 1971, 253). At the same time, Lebowitz’s wager on the proletariat reflects the positive element of this process, a concrete turn in the direction of something qualitatively new. Taking inspiration from the spirit of Negri’s writings, I would suggest that this approach to Lukács via Postone and Lebowitz should not simply be fixed and confined to the terms of Lukács’ work, but used as a means to read “Lukács beyond Lukács,” such that a re-actualization of his thought coincides with the activity of rendering it “effectively present.” If this project is successfully developed, Lukács will continue to provide resources with the potential to mitigate many of the difficulties faced by contemporary ruptural conceptions of subjectivity.

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